Monday, September 07, 2020

Court Denies Summary Judgment In Attempt To Permanently Enjoin Disclosure Requirements By Pro-Life Pregnancy Centers

 In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Rauner, (ND IL, Sept. 3, 2020), an Illinois federal district court denied summary judgment to two pro-life crisis pregnancy centers that are seeking to permanently enjoin enforcement of an Illinois statutory provision conditioning immunity for health care providers on their disclosure of medical options, including those that conflict with their religious beliefs. They must also facilitate patients' obtaining such services from others. In 2017, a different federal district court judge issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act. (See prior posting.) In refusing at this stage of litigation to make the injunction permanent, the court said in part:

In this litigation, Plaintiffs allege that the CPCs’ ability to promote their religiously motivated pro-life messaging ... are threatened by changes to the Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act adopted in 2016....The law will compel them, Plaintiffs assert, to discuss the benefits of treatments they deem objectionable: abortion, contraception, or sterilization. Likewise, under the law, Plaintiffs must facilitate those treatments by providing patients with lists of doctors who provide those services or by transferring or referring patients to them. Both requirements violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Speech and Free Exercise rights, they claim....

Starting with the requirement to discuss the benefits of abortion, the court agrees with Defendant that as in Casey, this is a regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally burdens speech....

The court is mindful that from Plaintiffs’ perspective, the law compels speech on a message antithetical to their beliefs and thereby contradicts this Free Speech principle. But the court too recognizes that Plaintiffs’ patients are no less deserving of this right to decide for themselves what ideas are worth considering and adhering to, and the state may be well within its powers to protect this principle in a context involving “matters of the highest privacy and the most personal nature.”...

If the law does no more than bring the regulations of conscience objectors into conformity with that of other medical professionals (again, still a disputed issue), then the amended HCRCA may not be characterized as discriminating against religious medical professionals. The law’s text and history ... suggest instead that the legislature adopted the changes due to legitimate concerns about patient access to healthcare and not out of a desire to stifle religiously-motivated conduct.