Russia’s use of “Spiritual Security”: An Interview with Kristina Stoeckl

The Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church have emphasized “spiritual-moral values” a great deal in recent years, including in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As part of a forthcoming special issue of The Review of Faith & International Affairs focused on religion and the OSCE’s concept of comprehensive security, Kristina Stoeckl has authored an article on the origins and impact Russia’s “spiritual security” doctrine.

In this conversation, Religion & Diplomacy editor Judd Birdsall poses several questions to Stoeckl about where “spiritual security” came from, how it’s being used by Russian leaders, and what policymakers can do about it.

Kristina Stoeckl is professor of sociology at the University of Innsbruck. She is the author of The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights (2014) and a forthcoming book (together with Dmitry Uzlaner) entitled The Moralist International: Russia in the Global Culture Wars (2022).

  

Birdsall: What is “spiritual security” and where did the concept come from?

Stoeckl: The concept of spiritual security has been present in the discourse of the Kremlin and of the Russian Orthodox Church since the year 2000. The concept describes a Russian legal and political doctrine that relates the security and stability of the Russian state and society to the upholding of certain religious, cultural, and moral values. The doctrine implies that these values are threatened from the outside (the West, religious groups, free internet, liberalism, foreign NGOs etc.) and that the Russian state and its allies (“the Russian World”) are under siege. The term “spiritual security” (духовная безопасностъ) is not used in official legal documents, but the term is used in commentary about these documents, in speeches by Russian politicians and clerics, and in academic papers.

Birdsall: What can the development of the concept of spiritual security tell us about the relationship between the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet era?

Stoeckl: In one of the first articles published about “spiritual security” in Russia, Julie Elkner gives the account of an emblematic event: in 2002, an Orthodox Church was consecrated on the grounds of the Lubyanka headquarters of the Federal Security Agency (FSB) in central Moscow. The FSB is the successor organization to the Soviet-era KGB. At the speeches of the inauguration, attended by Patriarch Alexii II and the FSB Director Nikolaj Patrushev (who, twenty years later, is still part of Putin’s administration as head of the Russian Security Council), those present expressed the wish to instill the work of the FSB with a “moral mission” to safeguard Russian identity and culture against undesirable influences. The little scene is revealing with regard to the way in which the relationship between the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet era has developed: the church has increasingly gone down the path of seeking close relations with those in power, obtaining attention and privileges by offering, in exchange, pious ideas about Russia’s mission and purpose.

Birdsall: How has the idea of spiritual security been used to motivate—or least justify—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

Stoeckl: “Spiritual-moral values” have been invoked repeatedly by Putin and by Patriarch Kirill in their justifications of the war and invasion of Ukraine. In their view, Russia is threatened by the West (read: liberal democratic government and individual rights and freedoms, especially gender rights) and a Ukraine that chooses a pro-European (and pro-NATO) political orientation. Remember, the motivations brought forward by the Russian leadership for the war are multifold and are, in part, even contradictory: Ukraine “is really historically a part of Russia and should not even exist,” Ukraine “is culturally part of the Russian world and should not choose a westward orientation,” Ukraine “is being used by the West to destroy Russia.” What all of these statements have in common is that Russia and the West are juxtaposed as incompatible, and Ukraine loses any agency and status.

Russian politicians, security agencies, and religious leaders who developed the National Security Strategy never concealed their deep conviction that Ukraine was an integral part of the Russian World and that controlling Ukraine was of vital interest for the nation’s spiritual security. In his speech at the beginning of the invasion, Putin justified the “special military operation” as necessary to protect Russia from harmful Western influences: “they sought to destroy our traditional values and force on us their false values that would erode us, our people, from within.” From the Ukrainian perspective, the Orange Revolution of 2004, the Maidan of 2014, and the declaration of church independence of a part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (breaking away from the Moscow Patriarchate) in 2018 were all milestones in a process of leaving the Russian sphere of influence. It is one of the deep paradoxes in the Russian discourse on spiritual security, that this development of Ukrainian society and politics was not taken seriously and not recognized by the Russian leadership.

Birdsall: You note in your forthcoming article that there’s an irony at the heart of Russia’s defense of “traditional values”—namely that they are not traditional emphases of Russian culture or the Russian Orthodox Church. Tell us about irony.

Stoeckl: It is absolutely necessary that we see Russia, despite its unique aggressor status in this very moment, as entangled in global dynamics. This is also true when it comes to “spiritual and moral values.” By the beginning of the twenty-first century, conservative family values have become a global, well-developed ideology with a whole arsenal of different sub-themes (pro-life, anti-gender rights), strategies (networking, conventions, lobbying) and sites of contestation (UN, Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights). As part of its external church relations, the Moscow Patriarchate picked up the main themes of the culture wars that dominated much of Western Christianity since the 1990s. Russian conservatives, pro-lifers, and pro-family activists only had to pick up a ready-made global agenda and adapt it to the Russian context. Paradoxically, therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state have securitized a concept of traditional family values that owes at least as much to the global culture wars as to the religious revival of post-soviet Russian society.

Birdsall: Have you seen religious actors, particularly Orthodox believers inside or outside Russia, pushing back against the idea of spiritual security? If so, what sort of arguments have they used?

Stoeckl: Not everybody inside the Russian Orthodox Church (let alone Russia) is happy with the close alliance between church and state. Many priests and theologians, who may otherwise agree with the traditional values agenda, actually think it is problematic that the church has become so close to those in power. There are also voices inside Orthodoxy (admittedly more outside Russia) that criticize the narrowing down of Orthodox doctrine to traditionalism. From my fieldwork and research, I would say that these actors use chiefly three types of arguments: theological (spiritual security is not an authentic Orthodox theological teaching), social (Russian society has a lot of other problems and grievances that should be addressed first and differently), and political (the church leadership is wrong in using spiritual security and in serving the state).

Birdsall: What advice do you have for diplomats and other foreign policy practitioners who are concerned about the way Russia has used spiritual security to undermine freedom of religion or belief, challenge the universality of human rights more generally, and to justify the “special military operation” in Ukraine? 

Stoeckl: First, do not fall for the polarization and dichotomization that the Russian narrative wants to produce. The war in Ukraine is not a culture war!

Second, it is important to understand that Russia is trying to establish itself as the alternative normative pole to the West in global affairs. In order to achieve this goal, it uses the instruments of international organizations (especially the human rights discourse) for exactly contrary ends. Russia’s goal is polarization, because it stands to gain from it. Western diplomats and foreign policy practitioners would therefore act wisely to avoid the polarization trap. I’ll give a concrete example: Russian actors continue to say that Russia defends itself against a West that wants to impose gay parades. Western actors should reply with an explanation, that gay rights are part and parcel of the idea of non-discrimination, according to which nobody should be discriminated on the basis of sex, gender, age, ability/disability, race, ethnic origin etc. Audiences that are not receptive to gender questions may be receptive to race, age, and disability questions. The principle of non-discrimination can be explained in different ways, preparing audiences for all dimensions of it. In short, where Russia narrows down the discourse, Western diplomats should enlarge and contextualize it. This is, admittedly, very difficult. I am not optimistic, actually.

For a full assessment of this complicated issue, you may want to read my article “Double bind at the UN: Western actors, Russia, and the traditionalist agenda.”