This week marks one year since war broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in the culmination of tensions and contradictions that have existed between the two groups since they seized power from the transitional government in October 2021.
What has been unusual about this war is that it started in the capital, Khartoum, and spread throughout the country. Since Sudan gained independence in 1956, conflicts and even revolutions have originated outside of the capital, which has often led to the insulation of communities in the centre, and arguably the north, of Sudan from the worst ramifications of the instability. Today however, few places in the country have been spared the large-scale hostilities between the two groups, and its impact on civilians has been catastrophic.
As the conflict enters its second year, it has claimed the lives of at least 13,000 people, and more than 33,000 have been injured. With the war intensifying in populated cities, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has risen to more than nine million, and the number of those facing hunger is now estimated to be as high as 20 million. In addition, there are over two million refugees, half of them Darfuri, also facing hunger. Tragically, for the second time in 20 years, there are also credible reports of atrocity crimes, with the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) noting that the situation now in Darfur is worse than when the Security Council referred Sudan to the court.
Out of Sudan’s 18 states, the RSF is in effective control of five of them – four states in Darfur, and Gezira State in the centre of the country where a civilian authority was established in March 2024. The militia are still fighting for control of other states, including Khartoum. As in Darfur, the RSF stands accused of serious crimes in Gezira State, where thousands of civilians have been forcibly displaced amid grave violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) including mass killing, rape, sexual slavery, forced displacement, enforced disappearance, attacks on civilians, and the looting and seizure of private property.
The SAF has largely retreated from states under the control of the RSF and has focused its military operations on Khartoum, a significant portion of which is held by the RSF. It has used its air force to attack communities indiscriminately, resulting in civilian deaths in South Kordofan’s Nuba Mountains and Darfur. To justify these crimes, the SAF has alleged that these areas are the RSF’s ‘social incubators’, in a continuation of a policy adopted in the al Bashir era that is aimed at destroying the social fabric by turning the conflict into a tribal one and increasing social antipathy.
For example, on 18 March the Criminal Court of Al-Gedaref sentenced a civilian to ten years’ imprisonment and death by hanging for having a photo in his phone showing him wearing traditional attire (Kadmol) and carrying a weapon, which led to charges of affiliation with the RSF.
The threat towards civilians in SAF controlled areas is increasing, with members of the previous regime joining forces with the army and calling for ‘popular resistance’ movements to support them. Meanwhile, Resistance Committees and many political parties continue to call for an immediate end to the war and the humanitarian and political crisis it has created.
Evidence of the SAF’s reliance on extremist Islamist groups is growing. These groups previously operated under the radar, but are once again empowered to act with impunity and ultimate authority. This empowerment is creating a burgeoning internal threat by increasingly shifting Sudan towards an Islamic State model. Tensions between religious groups and actions that seemingly are designed to cause violent conflict between Muslim sects are an alarming and underreported development.
Additionally, on 2 April a drone attack on an Iftar meal in Atbara in River Nile State left 13 dead and over 30 injured. The actual target of the attack was the leadership of the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade – an Islamist militia affiliated with the SAF – however, many civilians who had gathered to break the Ramadan fast and were injured. No group has claimed responsibility; however, such attacks heighten fears of the emergence of further fault lines of conflict that will worsen the already appalling plight of civilians. On 9 April, the RSF also used drones to attack communities in Al Gadarif State, significantly raising concerns of the group accessing airborne weaponry to attack states under SAF control or where IDPs have found relative safety.
Vulnerable groups, including women, children, refugees, internally displaced communities, and minority groups, have been left even more exposed to violent cycles of war. Recruitment of children by both parties to the conflict is on the rise. Sudan remains both a refugee producing and refugee hosting nation. Groups that have been displaced by other conflicts in the region are rendered exceptionally vulnerable.
The time for urgent action is now. The humanitarian crisis is deepening and the immediate needs of the population must be met. In addition, there must be a concerted global effort to bring an end to the conflict. The Jeddah platform is arguably one of the most independent among the various mediation initiatives; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa and the African Union (AU) appear to be heavily influenced by the RSF in addition to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for example, whereas Sudan’s influential neighbour, Egypt, is more aligned with the SAF due to national dynamics.
Efforts to bring the conflict to an end must also ensure the inclusion of civilian groups beyond the Forces for Freedom and Change and the Tagadum, who many see as allies of the RSF. Additionally, the international community must be prepared to adopt further punitive measures, including an arms embargo, if parties to the conflict show an unwillingness to agree and adhere to the terms of an immediate ceasefire. Furthermore, the illicit trade in oil, which is being smuggled into Libya, requires urgent investigation and international attention in order to reduce the funding which enables the two belligerents to prolong the conflict.
By CSW’s Sudan Desk
Featured Image by Mohamed Tohami on Unsplash.
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