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Restricting the right to use 'Allah'
The decision by the Malaysian Court of Appeal to uphold a government ban on the use of the word âAllahâ by members of any religion other than Islam has sparked a debate about freedom of religion
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he decision by the Malaysian Court of Appeal to uphold a government ban on the use of the word 'Allah' by members of any religion other than Islam has sparked a debate about freedom of religion.
The freedom to exercise religious activities, including worshipping, is clearly protected by human rights law. To be more specific, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) stipulates that the observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings, participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group.
The covenant also protects the practice and teaching of religion or belief including acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as, among others, the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.
Consequently, legally speaking, the freedom to use 'Allah' by any faith or religious groups would be protected by human rights law and, as with any other civil right, the state may not infringe it.
Nonetheless, in line with other civil rights, such a freedom is not limitless.
The ICCPR states that limitations on freedom of religion may be deemed necessary to preserve public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
The Human Rights Committee for the ICCPR adds to this interpretation by stating that the limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they are prescribed and must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. Lastly, it is also worth noting that restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.
From the interpretation, we may arrive at the understanding that any limitations on freedom to exercise religion should pass a rigid test of human rights and at this point the Malaysian Court of Appeal seems unable to meet the test.
First of all, it is hard to determine such a ban as 'necessary' to pursue legitimate aims. The notion of necessity, as the European Court of Human Rights argued, implies that 'interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued'.
Thus, despite (if there even was any) emerging pressing social need to forbid the use of 'Allah' by non-Muslims, such a limitation ought to be proportionate to protect the interest of human rights law.
Furthermore, based on the practice of human rights law, any limitations on freedom of religion ought to delineate, at the very least, the conspicuousness of the threat posed to the rights and freedoms of others. Thus, simply potential or worry would be inadequate to justify a limitation (or a ban) as proportionate.
As for the 'Allah' ban case, the mere worry regarding potential confusion among Moslems in the country could not be sufficient for the state to legitimately ban the use of 'Allah' for all the non-Muslims.
In a broader framework, this ban depicts an emerging promotion of particularity in human rights, which to a certain extent jeopardizes the rights themselves. Moreover, this particularity issue raises, as in this case, the politics of numbers that may derogate and delimit the rights and freedoms of minorities. As a consequence, any derogation from and limitations on minority groups will be judged merely by the predominant group's standards.
Regarding this phenomenon the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR observes 'that the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition.'
Hence, it is equally important for us, with regard to the ban on the use of 'Allah', to once again consider that by monopolizing 'truth', we may put ourselves at the edge of self-destruction. This ban policy might have a domino effect on society in the proximate region, especially Indonesia, which shares the same root culture and language as Malaysia.
However, in order to build a stronger democracy in the region, we should together be borne by the spirit of pluralism and the understanding of religious tolerance.
The writer is a research staffer at the Human Rights Research and Development Agency under the Law and Human Rights Ministry. The views expressed are personal.
