Beyond hard-line

By B.C.

AS I have previously written, one of the side-effects of Russia's intensifying conflict with Ukraine has been a surge in the prominence of an eccentric but influential philosopher, Alexander Dugin, who has the ear of the Russian establishment, even though he considers large sections of that establishment to be too soft, liberal and pro-American by half (yes). Mr Dugin is currently the leading advocate of a "Eurasian theory" of geopolitics which sees Russia as the epicentre of a great movement of resistance to the world's domination by the "Atlantic" and Anglo-Saxon powers. This great Eurasian counter-attack would march forward under the banner of Orthodox Christianity though it would also incorporate other religions.

As you would expect, Mr Dugin is cock-a-hoop over the recent successes of Russian-backed rebels in eastern and southern Ukraine, which he invariably describes as the Republic of Novorossiya, in other words a territory that rightly belongs to Russia (or at least the Russian sphere of influence) and is now being "liberated". He seems to be personally close to some of the Russian officers who have been leading the rebels on. He invariably refers to the Ukrainian government as a "junta" and was predicting several months ago that Ukraine would be partitioned de facto between a Russian-oriented east and an Atlantic-minded West.

In his latest pronouncement, Mr Dugin declares that "Orthodox Eurasianism"—sometimes used by critics as a catchall term for his ideological camp—is a label that he willingly accepts. What seems to worry him is that Russia's elite is only half-committed to this religious-nationalist dream. As for Vladimir Putin, he was a waverer: the president was "not fundamentally opposed to Orthodox Eurasianism [just] as, alas, he has no objection to liberal Atlanticism. He does not reveal his own ideology..." Fortunately, though, "when the time comes to act, [Putin] does what needs to be done and, in critical situations, it is always the right thing in terms of Orthodox Eurasianism."

One of the problems about basing a theory around a great confrontation between Orthodox Russia and her infidel enemies is that Orthodox Christianity is also the prevailing religion in Ukraine and two other countries—Georgia and Moldova—where Russia is directly or indirectly involved in an armed standoff. If Russia heeds Mr Dugin's advice and marches south and west, she is likely to be fighting against her co-religionists.

But unfortunately, a common religion has rarely stopped countries from going to war if they are determined enough to do so. In the late 19th and early 20th century, Orthodox Greeks and Orthodox Bulgarians did battle over the southern Balkans; with each side believing its cause was sacred. Even trivial religious differences can be an incentive to war, and they provide wonderful raw material for ideologues like Mr Dugin. But religious commonality doesn't always have the pacifying affect that you might expect.